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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Section 30-2-10, Utah Code
amended):

Annotated (1953, as

Homestead Rights - Custody of Children.

Neither the

husband nor wife can remove the other or their children from the
homestead without the consent of the other, unless the owner of
the property shall in good faith provide another homestead
suitable to the condition in life of the family; and if a
husband or wife abandones his or her spouse, that spouse is
entitled to the custody of the minor children, unless a court of
competent jurisdiction shall otherwise direct.

Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
ammended):

Custody of children in case of separation.

In any

case of separation of husband and wife having minor children, or
whenever a marriage is declared void or dissolved the court
shall make such order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it may deem just and proper.

In determining

custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the
child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of
each of the parties.

The court may inquire of the children and

take into consideration the children's desires regarding the
future custody; however, such expressed desires shall not be
controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the
children's custody otherwise.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties to this action were married
in Tucson, Arizona,

on May 2, 1968

At the time of the marriage, the Defendant

was still a young girl, having just turned 16 years of age
(Transcript-77, Line-24, hereinafter T-77,L-24).
four months pregnant.

She was also

The parties1 first child, Darla, was born

five months later on October 5, 1968. A second child, Beverly,
was added to the family on February 20, 1970, and

on October

19, 1971, Stephen, Jr., the parties' third child, was born.
Thus, after only three and one-half years of marriage,
Defendant, at 19 years of age, was a mother of three.
As a young wife, Defendant shouldered her heavy

1

responsibilities the best she could.

However, instead of

receiving help and support from Plaintiff, she found that he
would rather spend time drinking with his friends (T-78,L-14).
With three children to care for and no car, Defendant was forced
to stay home.

Her despair at this situation can clearly be seen

by reading a letter she wrote to Plaintiff on September 13, 1984
(Plaintiff's exhibit 8, pages 1 and 2), which contains a candid
look at her reflections of that period.

The Defendant's

troubles were also compounded by rumors that Plaintiff had been
unfaithful (T-78, L-23), and by the fact that on numerous
occasions, she suffered beatings when Plaintiff would come home
drunk (T-78,L-22).
As time passed, the parties1 relationship continued to
deteriorate.

Plaintiff insisted on taking gambling trips and at

one time stated his intention to become a professional
gambler(T-80,L-19).

To finance his gambling expeditions, family

funds were utilized, and the Defendant and the children were
again left home alone.

To make matters worse, Defendant and the

children were subjected to constant psychological abuse in which
Plaintiff would assure them of their negligible self worth
(T-33,L-6).
In March of 1984, the family suffered a tragedy which
put further pressure on the already faltering marriage.

2

On that

date, the parties1 oldest daughter, Darla, attempted suicide by
shooting herself in the head.

She sustained severe head

injuries, and has received ongoing therapy from a Salt Lake
Neuropsychologist to help her deal with her emotional problems.
The cause of this incident was found to be Darla's emotional
volatility, and was found not the fault of either parent (T-58).
In July of 1984, after Darla had made a rather
miraculous recovery and was doing well (T-65,L-l-5), the
relations between Defendant and Plaintiff became unbearable.
Defendant, with the parties' fourth and youngest child, Jamie
(born November 14, 1980), left the family home and traveled to
Missouri in order to stay with Defendant's brother (T-84).
During the trip, Defendant was accompanied by James Dvorak, a
friend of the Alexander family, and whose presence with
Defendant has caused
appeal.

much of the controversy surrounding this

Defendant flatly denied any romantic or sexual

involvment with Mr. Dvorak during this trip or thereafter
(T-86,L-8).
Defendant stayed in Missouri until March of 1985, at
which time she returned to Utah unannounced (T-89,L-9).

She

found that the family home was filthy, and a friend who
accompanied her stated that "...the house looked and smelled
like a chicken coop.

The carpet hadn't been swept or vacuumed
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it looked like for several months...ff (T-105 ,L-15).

They also

found that Stephen, Jr. had been missing substantial amounts of
school, and was barely passing his classes.
Defendant subsequently returned to Missouri, and is
currently residing with her mother and Jamie.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decisions rendered by the Trial Court in divorce
actions with respect to custody of children and the division of
the marital assests and liabilities are presumed valid, and will
be overturned on review only by showing that the court abused
its discretion.

Such a deference to the orders of the Trial

Court is due to its favorable proximity to the parties, and its
ability to observe the demeanor of witnesses.

Upholding the

rulings of the Trial Court is also important in custody disputes
because a change of custody after a lengthy appeal would
undermine the childs stability, and possibly cause more harm
than good.
In its decision regarding custody, the Trial Court did
not err for the following reasons.

First, there is ample

evidence to support a conclusion that the Defendant is the
person best able to care for the wants and needs of the child,
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Jamie.

Second, the Plaintiff presented no evidence that the

Defendant's alleged affair harmed the minor child in any way;
furthermore, there is adequate case law which supports the Trial
Court's award even though the Court found that Defendant engaged
in an affair.

Finally, the Plaintiff mis-interprets the meaning

of U.C.A., Section 30-2-10.

The statute allows the Trial Court

to make such custody orders as it deems proper in cases where a
spouse has abandoned the other spouse.

Thus, the Trial Court's

custody award was merely a use of the discretion which the
statute conferred on the Court.
The award of the Trial Court with respect to the
division of marital assets and liabilities was not an abuse of
its discretion, and should be affirmed by this Court.

The Trial

Court's order that Plaintiff assume responsibility for payment
of the marital debts was a proper use of the Court's discretion
in such matters, and is supported in part, by the fact that the
Defendant was not awarded alimony.

The Trial Court

properly

refused to consider hypothetical tax consequences when valuing
the Plaintiff's retirement account because such a valuation
would be based on speculation, and would not involve a taxable
event.

Finally, the Trial Court correctly valued the assets of

the marital estate at the time the marriage was terminated.
Thus, the courts inclusion of contributions to the marital

5

estate which were made by the Plaintiff before the decreee was
entered was just and proper, and supported by the law in this
State.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN
MAKING ORDERS REGARDING THE CUSTODY OF
CHILDREN AND THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS.

The standard of review to be applied to the Trial
Court's rulings in divorce matters has been well settled.

From

the decisions of this Court throughout the years, four distinct
standards have become apparent.
1.

They are as follows:

A presumption of validity is placed upon the Trial

Court's actions in divorce matters.

Berger v. Berger, Utah, 14

Ut. Ad. Rep. 4,5 (1985) ;
2.

The burden is on the Appellant to show error, and

the Trial Court's findings of fact will be overturned only if
they are contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218,22 (1980);
3.

The Trial Court's judgment will be overturned where

there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error.

Harding v.

Harding, 26 Utah 2d 273,280, 488 P.2d 308,310 (1971); and
4.

Where there has been such an abuse of discretion

that an inequity or injustice has resulted.
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Jorgenson v.

Jorgenson, Utah, 599 P.2d 510,512 (1979).
As can be seen from the above tests, the reviewing court
places a high degree of confidence in the Trial Court's
determination.

This is doubtless due to the Trial Court's

favorable proximity to the parties.

The trial judge is able to

see the parties and judge their demeanor, maturity and quality
firsthand. The benefit of such observations in making the
decisions attendant to divorce actions is obvious. Stuber v.
Stuber, 121 Ut. 632, 244 P.2d 650, (1952).

The Oregon Supreme

Court, in Bennehoff v. Bennehoff, 209 Or. 224, 225-26, 304 P.2d
1079 (1956) made this observation:
...In the difficult and delicate task of
attempting to determine where the welfare of
children lies as between conflicting claims
of warring parents, the judge who sees the
parties and their witnesses and listens to
their testimony has a position of advantage
over the justices of this court. This axiom
of appellate court review, so often referred
to in equity suits, is of prime importance
in its application to a child custody case
which involves, as does this one, an
appraisal of the character, temperment, and
disposition of the contending parents, some
of the determining marks of which may reveal
themselves to one who sees and observes the
persons concerned but are not to be found
in the typewritten pages of a cold record.
The decision of the trial judge in such a
case is, therefore, not to be lightly set
aside.
Another, and perhaps even more important reason why the
decision of the Trial Court should be given so much weight is
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the importance of maintaining stability in the lives of
children.

In his dissenting opinion to this Court's ruling in

Shioji v. Shioji, 23 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4,7 (11/27/85), Justice
Zimmerman made some very pertinent observations as to the
potential harm children face when custodial arrangements are
changed.

Two points brought out in the opinion deserve special

attention here.

First, lfa child needs a continuing relationship

with the person who cares for him, and any time that continuity
is broken, the child suffers.ff

Shioji, at p. 9, citing Whaley

v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App. 2nd 111, 399 N.E.2nd 1270, 1272 (1978),
and second, the observation by Dean Hafen, of the J. Rueben
Clark School of Law, that when

ff

the state" disrupts the

relationship of child-parent, even when their appears to be
inadequate parental care, more harm than good is frequently
done.

Shioji, at p.9.
In the instant case, the Defendant and the parties three

and one-half year old child, Jamie, left the family home in July
of 1984. They have been together ever since, and will continue
to reside together throughout the pendency of this appeal.
Since the time for processing an appeal with this Court now
takes between two and three years, it is very possible that when
a final decision is made, the child will have resided with the
Defendant for a period of over three years.
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During this period,

the child will undoubtedly fall into a stable living pattern and
become comfortable in her surroundings.

To make a change at

that late date would almost certainly cause a major trauma in
the child's life, and as Dean Hafen stated above, more harm
could be done than good.
The child should not have to suffer for this Court's
large backload of cases and the subsequent delay in resolving
cases.

It is very possible that the child could be taken out of

a stable, loving environment and placed in one entirely opposite
- all based on facts up to and over 3 years old, and without any
consideration of the present circumstances of the parties.

For

these reasons, this Court should defer to the decision of the
Trial Court, and require that any change of custody be
undertaken by a petition for modification where current facts
and circumstances of the parties could be reviewed in full.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN MAKING ITS AWARD OF CUSTODY.

The standard to be used in determining the custody of
children in divorce cases is found in the Utah Code, Section
30-3-10.

This section states that

10

fl

...The court shall make such

orders for the future care and custody of the minor children as
it may deem just and proper.

In determining custody, the court

shall consider the best interests of the child...tf

A review of

the evidence will clearly show that the Trial Court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Defendant custody of Jamie, and
that such an award was in the best interests of the children.

A. THE CUSTODY AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

In a case such as this, where both parties are at fault
and the dissolution of the marriage came about gradually
throughout the parties 17 years together, numerous factors must
be considered in determining

,f

the best interests of the child11.

The following is a discussion of some relevant factors the Trial
Court examined in reaching its conclusion:
1.

The Defendant is well trained in raising and caring

for children.
Since the parties married in 1968, the Defendant has had
the responsibility of caring for, and tending to the needs of
the parties children.

Kay Askee, a friend of both the Defendant

and Plaintiff, whose relationship with the family spanned a
period of five - six years, and who has been in the family home
many times, testified that the condition of the home was ,fkept
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very well1' and that in her opinion, the Defendant was a good
housekeeper (T-109,L-11).

Defendant's capacity as an able

homemaker and mother is further set out in the testimony of
Roger Carrender.

When Defendant first moved to Missouri, she

was offered the job of caring for Mr, Carrenderfs son who was
afflicted with Terats Syndrome (T-100,L-19).

Mr. Carrender

rented an apartment some distance from his home in a school
district which was specially equipped to handle his son's
disability.

He hired Defendant to stay with and look after the

boy since his work took him out of town for long periods of time
(T-101,L-6).

Also residing in the apartment was Mr. Carrenderfs

fiance, to whom he married two weeks following the trial. Mr.
Carrender did not reside in the apartment, nor did he have any
romantic involvement with the Defendant (T-102,L12).

Mr.

Carrender had this to say about the care his son received from
the Defendant (T-101,L-20):
Q - How has she done?
MR. CARRENDER - She has made more progress
with the child in seven months than the
other 200 people I've tried have done in
seven years.
Q - Does she keep the house tidy?
MR. CARRENDER - Immaculate.
The evidence paints a bleak picture of Plaintiff's
abilities as a homemaker.

Obviously, Plaintiff has not
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concentrated in that area because he has spent much of his time
away from the home engaging in his career.

However, upon

returning to Utah with the Defendant in March of 1985, Mr. Roger
Carrender gave the following testimony of the condition of the
family home (T-105 ,L-14):
Q - Can you tell the court what you
observed?
MR. CARRENDER: When I first walked into the
door, a bird cage was there with some kind
of quail. The house looked and smelled like
a chicken coop. The carpet hadn't been
swept or vacuumed it looked for several
months.
The kitchen was clutterd with trash.
Several days dishes on the counter. I
walked in, you could see in the bedroom from
the front room there was clothes hanging out
of every dresser drawer, on the bed. I
don't think there could have been a clean
clothes in the house.
In his findings, Judge Cornaby mentioned this testimony,
and warned Plaintiff that if such standards were maintained,
they would be grounds for losing custody.

Judge Cornaby stated

as follows (T-134,L-4):
I'm aware, too, that I can't ignore
the testimony, Mr. Alexander, that try like
you would, you may not be maintaining the
kind of cleanliness of a home that needs to
be for raising the three children you've
got.
I recognize it's only your wife and her
friends that have testified to those things.
They say their of a negative nature.
If they're as bad as they testified
to, there would be grounds for not allowing
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you to have custody of the three older
children. But you're the only one that is a
practical person to have custody of those
three older children, and if the home was as
bad as it's been testified to on the day
that your wife went in on March 1985, then
I'm assuming that was not a normal
condition.
The unannounced visit also shed some light on the
Plaintiff's supervision of the children there residing.

Upon

visiting the home during school hours, Stephen, Jr., the parties
14 year old son was found present.

Mr. Carrender, upon

questioning him as to his absence from school received the
following explanation (T-106,L-4):
Q - Was there any reason why he was there?
MR. CARRENDER: I took him outside and
talked with him for about an hour, and he
said the reason he had stayed home was
because his dad asked him to stay up the
night before and tape a movie for him and he
was tired.
Defendant became concerned about her sons absence, and
thereafter went to the school to inquire as to his academic
status.

She found that his absences totaled 15 days as compared

to a total of 13 days during the preceding four years.

His

Grade Point Average was listed as .85 for the most recent term
(Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2).
2.

Defendant is best suited to care for Jamie.

As has already been stated, Defendant and Jamie have
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been together continuosly since they left Utah in 1984.

Before

that time, Defendant was the major caretaker of Jamie, and
consequently, spent a great deal more time with the child than
did the Plaintiff.

It follows that the Defendant would be in a

much better position to respond to the wants and needs of the
young child.
Although Judge Cornaby recognized that there had been
some instability in Defendant's life, he found that such
instability did not cause her to be an unfit mother for custodypurposes.

In his findings, Judge Cornaby stated (T-141-142):
Now, I haven't found the Defendant to be an
unfit mother. I didn't say she was an unfit
mother any more than I said the Plaintiff
was an unfit father, but I think that as
between the two, I think you both have some
problems in raising kids. Part of the
Plaintiff's problem is because he's spent
most of his married life earning a living,
not raising children. And though I find -I'm saying there's some instability. I
recognize that instability in the
Defendant's life. I'm not saying that its
such an instability that it creates her from
being a fit parent for that one child, and
of all the children to award to her, that's
obviously to the Court the best division the
Court can make.

The reasonableness of Judge Cornaby's findings can also
be supported by the fact that Jamie is ten and one-half years
younger than the next oldest child, Stephen, Jr..

As such, it

could not be expected that Jamie would always have one of her
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older brothers or sisters as a playmate or caretaker, especially
in light of the fact that all three of the older children are
going through their teenage years and will surely have interests
other than caring for a minor child.
3.

Defendant has established a plan for the care of the

child.
Defendant testified that her mother will be living with
her, and will be able to care for the child while Defendant is
at school or work (T-93,L-3).

This arrangement is doubtless

more satisfactory than that planned by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff

stated as follows concerning his plans for the care of the
children (T-32,L-2):
Q - If you were to have custody of her
[Jamie], what would your plans of care be?
A - I've already checked into putting her
into child care with Young World which is in
the same block I live on, or with a mother
who has children her age.
Q - So, therfore, your plans for her
basically involve day care of some sort?
A - That's correct.
Q - Now, your other children are in schools
here in Millcreek Junior High; is that
correct?
A - Two are in junior high; one is in high
school.
Q - Who will supervise them between the time
that they return home from school and the
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time that you return home from work?
you made plans for that?

Have

A - They supervise theirselves until I get
home, and do a very adequate job of it.
There should be no question that receiving care from a
mother or grandmother would be superior to that of day care.
Further, the evidence already shown regarding Plaintiff's
supervision of the children makes his assertion that the
children will supervise themselves hard to believe.

As has been

shown, Stephen Jr. 's supervision of himself included not going
to school and staying up late on a school night (T-106,L-4).
4.

Dr. Nilssonfs findings are suspect, and should be

weighed accordingly.
Dr. Nilsson, the Neuropsychologist who treated Darla
following her suicide attempt, concluded that Plaintiff should
be awarded custody of all four of the parties children because
of the Defendant's instability.

His findings are suspect for

the following reasons:
First, his acquaintance with Defendant was during a
short five month period based upon 15-20 one hour visits which
included Darla and sometimes the entire family.

Thus, his

attention was not exclusively fixed on the Defendant.

This

small amount of time was also during the most traumatic,
stressful period of the marriage, that of Darla1s suicide
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attempt.

When asked about the trauma parents suffer as a result

of a suicide attempt by one of their children, Dr. Nilsson
stated (T-62,L-15):
Q - Now, Dr. Nilsson, as far as a trauma
that the parents are faced with, in your
opinion, where does an attempted suicide of
a child range on a scale of one to ten, with
one as least traumatic and ten the most
traumatic?
A - If d say ten
Q - Very, very traumatic?
event?

Very stressful

A - Yes.
Q - You never did have contact with Diane
Alexander before the time of Darla's
attempted suicide, did you?
A - No, my first contact with her was
when—when she was in the hospital.
Q - Right. So, therefore, your exposure to
Diane has been one where Diane has been
under a tremendous amount of stress?
A - Yes.
Dr. Nilsson further testified that Defendant would have
suffered additional stress because she found Darla immediately
after the shooting and because she had no close family members
to lean on at the time (T-63,L-13).
Second, Dr. Nilsson admitted that he had given the
parents no type of objective testing to inquire as to their
personalities (T-61,L-17), that he had never been inside of the
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family home (T-70,L-2), and that he was hired only for the
purpose of helping Darla, and not to counsel the parties as to
their marriage (T-59,L11).

He further admitted that any

information he received about Defendant after she left Utah in
July of 1984 came from the Plaintiff or the children, not from
his personal observations (T-61,L-8).
Finally, when pressed as to what it would take for the
Defendant to be able to have custody of the children, Dr.
Nilsson stated (T-70,L-6):
A - Demonstrated stability, consistency.
Right now, frankly, it would take her
talking the children into living with her.
Q - But if she were to have a stable
environment, you wouldn't be against having
her have the custody of the children?
A - If there was some demonstrated track
record of stability...
Defendant has since satisfied the concerns of Dr.
Nilsson.

She is now away from the major source of her

instability - Plaintiff.

She is not faced with the traumatic

incident of a child's suicide or a crumbling marriage - two
events which few people have to endure at the same time.
As has been set forth above, the Trial Court had ample
evidence to support its custody award.

The award has not

resulted in an injustice nor has the Plaintiff overcome the
presumption of validity which the court's ruling enjoys.
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Accordingly, this Court should uphold the order of the Trial
Court respecting custody of the children,

B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
HAD AN AFFAIR DOES NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY
OF ITS CUSTODY AWARD.

Although it is true that the Trial Court found that
Defendant had had an affair with another man, such an act, by
itself, does not mean that the Trial Court abused its discretion
in awarding Defendant custody of Jamie,

The law respecting this

subject is found in a series of cases which start with Stuber v.
Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (1952).

In Stuber, at p.

637, this Court found that ,fthe fact that she lived with a man
whom she expected to marry, although censurable, does not in
itself make her an improper person to have the custody of her
child.M

The law in other states is similar.

In In the matter

of the Marraige of Whitlow, Or. App., 550 P.2d 1404,6, (1976),
the court found that the wife's single brief affair did not
establish her as an unfit parent, and further stated that ffThere
was no evidence that the affair itself had a detrimental effect
on the child."

In the 1985 case of Wall v. Wall, Utah, 700

P.2d 1284 (1985), this Court upheld a custody award to the
mother, despite the fact that the mother's boyfriend

20

occasionally spent the night with the mother and her son.

This

Court accepted the Trial Court's findings that no indiscretion
occurred in the child's presence and therefore upheld the award.
In all of these cases, the key element seems to be
whether or not the extramarital conduct was carried on in the
presence of the child and if the conduct was shown to be
detrimental to the child.

Unless this is shown, a change of

custody is not warranted.

In the present case, there is no

evidence whatsoever that Defendant's extramarital relations, if
any, had any adverse effect on Jamie.

Although James Dvorak

admitted that he, Defendant and Jamie had shared the same bed,
there was no evidence that any kind of romantic or sexual
activity was carried on in the presence of the child, nor did
Plaintiff show or attempt to show that Jamie had been harmed in
anyway from the incident.

Without any evidence of the above,

this Court should give deference to the findings of the Trial
Court and affirm its custody award.

C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 30-2-10 WHEN MAKING ITS
CUSTODY AWARD.

Section 30-2-10 of the Utah Code provides as follows:
Neither the husband nor wife can remove
the other or their children from the
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homestead without the consent of the other,
unless the owner of the property shall in
good faith provide another homestead
suitable to the condition in life of the
family; and if a husband or wife abandones
his or her spouse, that spouse is entitled
to the custody of the minor children, unless
a court of competent jurisdiction shall
otherwise direct.
Although the Trial Court found that Defendant abandoned
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is wrong in his interpretation of
the statute.

The Plaintiff neglects the last nine words of the

statute which provide "unless a court of competent jurisdiction
shall otherwise direct.ff
case.

The Trial Court did just that in this

Since the Statute allows a Trial Court to use its

discretion in abandonement cases, the Trial Court's award in the
instant case was a legitimate use of its discretion in such
matters, and was therefore not an abuse of discretion.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED THE
OBLIGATIONS AND PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE.

As in a custody award, the Trial Court is accorded great
discretion in dividing the assets and liabilities of the
marriage.

This Court stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615

P.2d 1218 (1980) that:
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There is no fixed formula upon which to
determine a division of property, it is a
prerogative of the court to make whatever
disposition of property as it deems fair,
equitable, and necessary for the protection
and welfare of the parties. In the division
of marital property, the trial judge has
wide discretion, and his findings will not
be disturbed unless the record indicates an
abuse thereof.
In reviewing the Trial Court's order as it pertains to
the division of assets and liabilities, this Court should take
into consideration the fact that the Trial Judge did not award
the Defendant alimony (T-136,L-23).

The refusal to award

alimony in this case played a major part in the courts division
of assets and obligations.

This is plainly evident from the

following excerpt from the record (T-139 ,L-11):
MR. LINDSLEY: Did your honor take into
account the debts and subtracting them from
the total value of the marriage?
THE COURT: No, I didn't. I took that into
account in deciding whether or not he ought
to pay alimony. Normally, with a 17-year
marriage, in a situation like this, you'd
probably expect the Plaintiff to pay three
or four or five hundred dollars a month for
a period of two or three years to help the
other party get on some kind of equivalent
buying power, and I haven't done it
partially balancing out these equities
between the parties, and partially because
she chose to walk away from the marriage in
the way she did.
The refusal to grant alimony in a case where the
marriage lasted 17 years, where the Defendant was 16 years old
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at the time of marriage, had only a tenth grade education, and
has not furthered her education or trained for any skill since
that time, should not be taken lightly.

Accordingly, the Trial

Court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the assets and
providing for payment of the marital liabilities.

A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
CONSIDER HYPOTHETICAL TAX LIABILITIES WHEN
PLACING A VALUE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT.

The Trial Court properly refused to reduce the value of
Plaintiff's retirement account by hypothetical amounts of tax
because the valuation did not cause a taxable event, and any
effort to determine the future tax liability would be mere
speculation.

In Gilbert v. Gilbert, Mont. 628 P.2d 1088,

(1981), the Montana Supreme Court was faced with this same
issue.

The court stated:
We find, however, that the property
distribution ordered by the District Court
includes no presently taxable events and
triggers no tax liability. The District
Court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to consider the theoretical income
tax consequences of a present liquidation
which is neither necessary nor probable, but
merely conjectural.
This same conclusion has been upheld in the following
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jurisdictions:

Re Marriage of Johnson, 106 111. App. 3rd 502,

62 111. Dec. 478, 436 N.E.2d 228 (1982); Re Marriage of Hayne,
334 N.W. 2d 347, Iowa App. (1983); In re Marriage of Sharp, 143
Cal. App. 3d 714, 192 Cal Rptr 97, 4th Dist. (1983); Re Marriage
of Miller, 112 111. App. 3d 203, 68 111. Dec. 167, 445 N.E. 2d
811 (1983); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 657 P.2d 646 (1983);
Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W. 2d 21 (1979 S. Dakota); In re
Marriage of Beck, Montana, 631 P.2d 282 (1981).
Because the great weight of authority is against
reducing the value of marital property by amounts representing
hypothetical future taxation, the Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion in doing the same.

Under the circumstances, and

especially in light of its refusal to award alimony, the ruling
of the Trial Court was just and proper.

B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE
LIABILITIES OF THE MARRAIGE.

As was earlier stated, the Trial Court's order that
Plaintiff pay the liabilities of the marriage was taken into
consideration when the Court decided not to award the
alimony.

Defendant

Such an act was clearly within the province of the

Trial Court, and therefore, not an abuse of discretion.
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C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY VALUATED THE
MARITAL ESTATE.

This Court has made clear that the marital estate is
evaluated according to what property existed at the time the
marriage terminated.

Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,22, Jesperson v.

Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326,328 (1980).

In this case, the

marriage was terminated on April 22, 1985, and therefore,
valuation of the property held by the parties at that time would
be a proper function of the Trial Court.

Accordingly, the Trial

Court did not abuse its discretion by including in the value of
the marital estate those contributions made by Plaintiff after
the parties were separated.

It should be noted that this is not

a case in which the parties were separated a long period before
the divorce action was initiated.

The parties separated on July

18, 1984 (See Record, P.11, hereinafter, R-ll), and the divorce
was instituted on August 13, 1984 (R-l), less than one month
later.
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CONCLUSION

The Trial Court was reasonable and proper in its
determination of the issues in this case.

Through the use of

its broad discretion and its observation of the demeanor of the
parties and their witnesses, the court entered a decree which
was both in the best interests of the children, and which also
provided for the future welfare and well being of the parties.
The Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption of validity that
this Court places on the Trial Court's rulings in divorce
matters.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the

Trial Court which is the subject of this review.
DATED this 7 ^ -

3ay of P<£c£Mj?^,

1985.

JAMES B. HANKS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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